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CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO 
CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION: THE 
BRUSSELS CONVENTION AND FORUM 
NON CONVENIENS 
Christopher D Bougen* 
In developing an earlier article, published as “Time to Revisit Forum Non Conveniens in the 
United Kingdom? Group Josi Reinsurance Co v UGIC (2000) 32 VUWLR 705, this paper takes 
the debate further.  The discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens continues to be a 
controversial doctrine, and its relationship with the mandatory jurisdiction provisions of the Brussels 
Convention often leads to courts considering the correct methodology.  Due to the seemingly growing 
acceptance of an expansive view of the scope of the Convention, this article looks to the future of 
forum non conveniens in the United Kingdom.  Seemingly, there is sufficient flexibility within the 
Convention, for its jurisdiction rules to be the sole determinant of jurisdiction. 
I INTRODUCTION  
The world of global commerce brings with it increasing cross-border activity and, as a 
natural consequence, legal disputes that also transcend national boundaries. Where parties 
to such disputes find themselves before a court, one of the first issues that arises is where 
should the case be heard: the courts of which country have jurisdiction to hear the case?  
Jurisdiction disputes have become something of an opening stanza for much of the inter-
jurisdiction litigation that comes before a court. It has been observed, for example, that "in 
the American civil litigation system today, few cases reach trial. After perhaps some initial 
skirmishing, most cases settle. Yet all cases entail forum selection, which has a major impact 
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on outcome".1 Simply put, "venue is worth fighting over because outcome often turns on 
forum".2 
This situation is clearly far from satisfactory. As Professor Schlosser, in his 1979 report 
on the Brussels Convention remarked, "a plaintiff must be sure which court has jurisdiction. 
He should not have to waste his time and money risking that the court concerned may 
consider itself less competent than another".3 
This paper examines two disparate schemes that attempt to settle questions of 
jurisdiction in cases that have a cross-border element and involve two or more competent 
courts competing for jurisdiction. It explores the approach of the 1968 Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels 
Convention), a convention between European Union member countries that addresses 
jurisdiction disputes, and also the approach adopted under the domestic rules and 
jurisprudence of private international law in the United Kingdom. The paper highlights the 
conflicting philosophies and approaches to the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction and in 
particular focuses on the dispute as to whether the discretionary power to stay proceedings 
on the ground of forum non conveniens survives in the United Kingdom, given that the 
United Kingdom is a Contracting State of the Brussels Convention. This debate has been 
continuing for some time, with the United Kingdom Courts seemingly reluctant to depart 
from the discretionary determination of jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in favour of the more rigid rule-based approach adopted by Continental 
European countries and the Brussels Convention. Recent judicial developments in Europe 
and the United Kingdom are considered in this context. The central question considered in 
this paper is the compatibility of the Brussels Convention and the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. Is a stay of proceedings on these grounds still available and should it still be 
available? 
II  THE APPROACH OF THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION TO 
DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION AND CONFLICTS OF 
JURISDICTION 
The Brussels Convention was created for the purpose of addressing questions of 
jurisdiction arising among member states of the European Union by providing mandatory 
rules for determining jurisdiction in matters that come within the scope of the Convention. 
  
1 Kevin M Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg "Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping" (1995) 80 
Cornell L Rev 1507, 1508. 
2 Clermont and Eisenberg, above. 
3 Peter F Schlosser "Report on the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom to the Brussels Convention" (1979) C 59/71, para 78. 
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In the Jenard report on the Brussels Convention, one of the purposes of the Convention was 
described as achieving the greatest possible legal certainty by establishing common rules of 
jurisdiction.4 
The Brussels Convention provides that as a general rule the courts of the defendant's 
domicile are to have jurisdiction.5 This rule is based on the maxim actor sequitur forum rei, 
the rationale being that it is easier, in principle, for a defendant to defend themselves in 
courts of their location.6 This general rule is subject only to the limited specific exceptions 
provided for in the Brussels Convention. These rules of special jurisdiction provide, for 
example, that the defendant may be sued in the place of performance of a contractual 
obligation,7 or the place where the harmful event occurred (for an action in tort).8 The 
general rule is further subject to the specific rules of exclusive jurisdiction. Irrespective of 
domicile, actions in rem that have as their object immovable property must be brought in the 
forum rei sitae,9 and actions relating to registered intellectual property (for example, patents 
and trademarks) must be brought in the courts of the country of registration.10 Where one of 
the parties is domiciled in a Contracting State and the parties have themselves agreed that a 
court of a Contracting State are to have jurisdiction in respect of particular matters, then that 
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction.11 European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law has held 
that these rules that derogate from the general rule of jurisdiction based on domicile are to 
be construed strictly and cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases 
expressly envisaged by the Brussels Convention.12 
The ECJ has remarked that rules of special jurisdiction constitute an additional option 
for the plaintiff alongside the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is 
  
4 Peter Jenard "Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters" (1979) OJ C 59/1, 15. 
5 The 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, art 2 [Brussels Convention]. 
6 Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company [2000] ILPR 549; [2001] QB 
68, para 35 (ECJ). 
7 Brussels Convention, art 5 (1). 
8  Brussels Convention, art 5 (3). 
9  Brussels Convention, art 16 (1). 
10 Brussels Convention, art 16 (4). 
11 Brussels Convention, art 17. 
12 Reunion Europeenne SA v Spliethoff's Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECR I-6511 (ECJ); Group Josi 
Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company [2000] ILPR 549; [2001] QB 68, para 
49 (ECJ). 
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domiciled, that being the general rule underlying the Brussels Convention.13 Thus, the ECJ 
is in effect acquiescing limited forum shopping in situations where the requirements of the 
general rule of jurisdiction and those of the special rules of jurisdiction are satisfied.  
Furthermore, the Brussels Convention does not define domicile. This determination is 
left to the national law of the Contracting States.14 The importance of this point will become 
apparent later, but it suffices to say that this immediately creates an element of confusion.   
Complementing these basic rules of jurisdiction, the Brussels Convention also provides 
rules pertaining to the situation where two courts are in conflict over jurisdiction. When the 
proceedings before two or more courts involve the same cause of action and the same 
parties, article 21 of the Brussels Convention requires any court other than the court first 
seised to, firstly, stay proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, 
and secondly, if so established, to decline jurisdiction. There is no element of discretion 
involved or consideration of factors relevant to an inquiry pursuant to a forum non 
conveniens claim. The sole consideration is whether the requisite elements of the mandatory 
rules of the Brussels Convention, or their limited exceptions, have been satisfied. 
Supplementary to article 21, article 22 provides that where there are related actions 
pending in two or more Contracting States, any court other than the court first seised may, 
while the actions are pending at first instance, stay its proceedings if the law of that court 
permits consolidation of related actions and the court first seised has jurisdiction over both 
actions. Once again, the court first seised has priority, but the second court has a limited 
amount of discretion in determining whether the actions are related. Article 22 states that 
actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely linked that it is expedient to hear 
and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings. The discretion, then, relates to the decision by the court seised second 
or later as to whether to await the outcome of the proceedings in the first court, so as to 
ensure consistency of judgments or to go ahead and risk irreconcilable judgments.15 Thus, 
article 21 is a mandatory provision, applicable where two actions are the same, and article 
22, applicable only where proceedings are related and do not involve the same cause of 
action and the same parties, is more discretionary in nature. 
In this way, the Brussels Convention provides limited rules for determining jurisdiction 
where two courts are seised. Articles 21 and 22 provide a simple court first seised rule, 
predicated of course upon the competing courts being competent pursuant to the rules of 
  
13  Group Josi, above, para 40.  
14  Brussels Convention, arts 52 and 53. 
15  Wendy Kennett "Forum Non Conveniens in Europe" (1995) 54 CLJ 552, 553. 
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jurisdiction provided for in the Convention. Questions of comparative appropriateness, 
unlike a forum non conveniens inquiry, are not relevant. The rules of the Brussels Convention 
itself stipulate what is appropriate. Indeed, the ECJ has emphasised that the Brussels 
Convention was designed in part to confer jurisdiction on the national court which was best 
qualified to determine a dispute,16 although there is also a recognition that the application 
of the rules may lead to a case being heard in a forum which does not have the closest 
connection with the dispute.17  
It is in this regard that the question arises of the need for a discretionary power to stay 
an action in favour of another court that is argued to be more appropriate. It has been 
observed that in Continental Europe there exists a strong philosophical disapproval of 
judicial discretion in relation to jurisdiction. In Germany, for example, individuals have a 
constitutional right to have access to the courts to seek protection of their rights and the 
suggestion that a judge may exercise a discretion in deciding whether or not to retain 
jurisdiction is abhorrent.18 Furthermore, a strong argument could be made that, once 
jurisdiction has been established on the basis of accepted criteria, a plaintiff has a right to 
equal access to justice regardless of their domicile and regardless of the potential availability 
of an alternative forum. Such a strong advocacy of certainty in the allocation of jurisdiction 
has also been stressed by the ECJ in interpreting the Brussels Convention.19 
III THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH TO JURISDICTION 
Standing in stark contrast to the Brussels Convention regime, the United Kingdom 
Courts have traditionally enjoyed wide jurisdictional powers based on service of process. 
Thus, where a defendant is validly served within the United Kingdom with notice of 
proceedings, the United Kingdom Courts have in personam jurisdiction as of right.20 
Alternatively, the court may grant leave to serve proceedings on a defendant outside of the 
jurisdiction of the court provided the court is satisfied that the case is a proper one for 
service outside its jurisdiction.21 This "exorbitant"22 jurisdiction is counterbalanced by the 
  
16  Effer SpA v Kantner [1982] ECR 825, 834 (ECJ). 
17  Custom Made Commercial Ltd v Stawa Metallbau GmbH [1994] ECR I-2913, para 16-18 (ECJ). 
18  Kennett, above, 560. 
19  Custom Made Commercial Ltd v Stawa Metallbau GmbH, above, para 18. 
20  See Dicey and Morris The Conflict of Laws (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000) Rule 22(1), 263. 
21  RSC Ord 11, r 1(1). 
22 As described by Peter F Schlosser "Report on the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom to the Brussels Convention" (1979) OJ C 59/71, paras 82 
and 86. 
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doctrine of forum non conveniens, a common law power of the courts to grant a stay of 
proceedings where in the court's view there is an alternative forum in another jurisdiction 
which is competent to hear the case and which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the 
action, that is, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all parties 
and the ends of justice. Once the court is satisfied of the existence of an alternative 
competent forum, a stay will be granted unless the claimant can show that, even though 
there are factors connecting the proceedings with the foreign forum, substantial justice will 
not be obtained in the foreign jurisdiction.23 This regime provides a mechanism for 
determining which court has jurisdiction to hear proceedings that have a cross-border 
element to them and in respect of which more than one court is competent to hear the case. 
Procedural rules changed, however, following the enactment of the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982, the legislation that gave effect in the United Kingdom to the 
Brussels Convention. As the learned authors of Dicey and Morris observe, where a claim 
relates to a civil or commercial matter within the scope of the Brussels Convention, the 
United Kingdom Court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim in personam solely in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention.24 Where the Brussels Convention does not apply, in 
personam jurisdiction is based on the traditional common law rule of service of process. 
The consistency of the idiosyncratic United Kingdom doctrine of forum non conveniens25 
with the Brussels Convention has been the subject of much debate over the last decade. At 
the time of the United Kingdom's accession to the Brussels Convention, there was clear 
evidence of the reluctance of the United Kingdom to depart from the discretionary power of 
forum non conveniens in favour of the mandatory rules provided for in the Brussels 
Convention. When the United Kingdom acceded to the Brussels Convention in 1979, they 
tried to negotiate the introduction of a forum non conveniens clause in the Convention, 
allowing the United Kingdom Courts to retain the power to grant a stay on these grounds. 
This was resisted by the other member states, who argued that the provisions of the 
Brussels Convention itself have selected the convenient fora, all of them having some links 
to the case.26 The United Kingdom ultimately acquiesced. However, the power to grant a 
stay on these grounds is specifically preserved under section 49 of the Civil Jurisdiction and 
  
23  Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 476-482 (HL) Lord Goff. 
24  Dicey and Morris, above, Rule 22(2), 263. 
25 Within the European Union, only the courts in the United Kingdom and Ireland recognise this 
discretionary power. See Mathias Reimann Conflict of Laws in Western Europe (Transnational 
Publishers, New York,  1995) 82. 
26 Peter F Scholsser "Report on the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom to the Brussels Convention" (1979) OJ C 59/71, para 78. 
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Judgments Act 1982 incorporating the Brussels Convention into United Kingdom law, in so 
far as it is not inconsistent with the principles of the Brussels Convention.27 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens also enjoys strong judicial support. It would not be 
an overstatement to say that the United Kingdom Courts are quite attached to the doctrine. 
Lord Goff, writing for the House of Lords only a few years ago in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel 
could hardly contain his delight when he observed, in a postscript to his judgment, that 
several overseas jurisdictions had already adopted the doctrine, and further expressed his 
hope that it would continue to spread. Indeed, his Lordship described the principle as one 
of the most civilised of legal principles.28 
Initial judicial examination, however, of the relationship between forum non conveniens 
and the Brussels Convention found in favour of a departure from this discretionary power 
in favour of the mandatory rules of the Convention. The High Court ruled in two cases that 
whenever an English domiciliary was sued in England in a civil or commercial matter, the 
effect of the Convention meant that the courts no longer had the power to stay proceedings 
for reasons of forum non conveniens, even if there were proceedings already pending before 
the courts of a non-contracting state.29 In both instances, English domiciled insurance 
companies were sued by United States plaintiffs and both sought to stay the English 
proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds. The High Court in these cases took the view 
that the exercise of discretion under the Brussels Convention was mandatory once invoked 
by plaintiff and that forum non conveniens, being a uniquely British discretionary power to 
decline jurisdiction, was incompatible with the scheme of the Brussels Convention. 
Regarding the scope of the Brussels Convention, Justice Hobhouse in Berisford held that:30 
 [i]t is clear that the Convention is designed to achieve uniformity and to 'harmonise' the 
relevant procedural and jurisdictional rules of the Courts of the Contracting States. The 
Convention leaves no room for the application of any discretionary jurisdiction by the court of 
[the United Kingdom]; the availability of such a discretion would destroy the framework of the 
Convention. 
These two decisions were subsequently overruled by the Court of Appeal in In re 
Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. This case involved a defendant company domiciled in the United 
Kingdom by virtue of its incorporation there. It was also domiciled in Argentina, which was 
  
27  Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK), s 49. 
28  Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119, 141 (HL) Lord Goff. 
29 S & W Berisford Plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1990] 2 QB 631 and Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co 
v Bryanston Insurance Co [1990] 2 QB 649. 
30  Berisford, above, 645, Hobhouse J.  
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the exclusive location of the company's business and its central management and control. 
The plaintiff was a Swiss domiciled company. The plaintiff brought proceedings in the 
United Kingdom and invoked article 2 of the Brussels Convention, arguing that the United 
Kingdom Courts, being the forum of the defendant's domicile, had mandatory jurisdiction 
that precluded a grant of a stay in favour of the courts in Argentina on the grounds of forum 
non conveniens.  
In overruling the two previous first instance decisions, the Court of Appeal agreed in 
principle that a stay on the grounds of forum non conveniens was not available in cases where 
the two competing jurisdictions were both Contracting States (that is, England and another 
Contracting State).31 However it found that there was nothing to prevent the application of 
the doctrine when the conflict is between the courts of England and the courts of a non-
Contracting State. In the Court's view, the Convention did not apply. The scope of the 
Brussels Convention, then, was the determinative issue. In the view of the Court of Appeal, 
the scope of the Brussels Convention was effectively limited to conflicts of jurisdiction 
between courts of Contracting States only. 
In arriving at this decision, the Court considered the true construction of the Brussels 
Convention.32 Lord Justice Dillon saw the Brussels Convention as implementing the aim of 
article 220 of the European Community Treaty which was essentially to simplify formalities 
between European Community-member states. A common basis of international jurisdiction 
in matters which fall within the scope of the Brussels Convention was seen as important in 
achieving this goal.33 Given that the Brussels Convention was merely an agreement between 
the Contracting States among themselves, Lord Justice Dillon did not feel that the 
framework of the Convention would be destroyed if there were available to the English 
Court a discretion to refuse jurisdiction, on the ground that the courts of a non-Contracting 
State were the appropriate forum, in a case with which no other Contracting State was 
concerned.34 
Lord Justice Dillon did not regard as helpful the reports by Jenard and Schlosser that 
had concluded that forum non conveniens was incompatible with the Brussels Convention, 
because in the view of Lord Justice Dillon, Jenard and Schlosser had not contemplated that 
  
31 In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72, 93 (CA) Dillon LJ. 
32 Harrods, above, 95. 
33  Harrods, above, 96. 
34  Harrods, above, 97. 
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particular question. There were general statements in the reports which could be used as 
pointers either way, but nothing conclusive.35 
At the present time, the United Kingdom Courts undoubtedly still regard Harrods as 
being the leading, and binding, judicial statement on the relationship between the Brussels 
Convention and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In the recent case of Ace Insurance,36 
the Court of Appeal applied Harrods and upheld a lower court ruling, decided around the 
same time as the Group Josi case discussed below, that there was still a discretion to grant a 
stay of proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens where the English court had 
jurisdiction by virtue of the Lugano Convention, a convention complementary to the 
Brussels Convention.37  
Despite being recognised as the current leading United Kingdom case on the relation 
between the Brussels Convention and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the Harrods 
decision is not free from controversy. The Court of Appeal ruling in Harrods was appealed, 
and the House of Lords, after hearing arguments from the parties for several days, referred 
the matter to the ECJ. However the case was ultimately settled without the ECJ issuing a 
ruling.38 Similarly, in the more recent case of Lubbe v Cape Plc,39 the House of Lords again 
recognised the controversy and commented that were the case to turn on this issue, a ruling 
from the ECJ on the applicability of article 2 of the Brussels Convention would have been 
necessary. Indeed Lord Bingham hinted there that the correctness of Harrods is an issue and 
that whether article 2 of the Brussels Convention applies is not clear.40 
Commentators have long pointed out that the lack of explicit reference within the 
Brussels Convention about the precise limits of its international operation has always been 
problematic and has contributed in large part to the uncertainty in the law regarding the 
  
35 Harrods, above, 96.  
36 Ace Insurance SA-NV v Zurich Insurance Company and Zurich America Insurance Company [2001] 
EWCA CIV 173 (CA). 
37 The Lugano Convention is an agreement between the European Union members and the members 
of EFTA (European Free Trade Area). It is almost identical to the Brussels Convention and 
functionally it extends the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Convention beyond the European 
Union to the EFTA states. 
38 Ace Insurance, above, para 28. 
39 Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 4 All ER 268 (HL) Lord Bingham. This is perhaps ironic given that Bingham 
LJ, as he then was, concurred with Dillon LJ in In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72 (CA) in 
finding a limited scope of application of the Brussels Convention. See, In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) 
Ltd [1992] Ch 72, 98 (CA) Bingham LJ. 
40 Lubbe v Cape Plc, above, 282.  
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Convention.41 The preamble of the Brussels Convention refers to the determination of 
international jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties as necessary for the purpose of 
strengthening the legal protection of persons therein.42 The application of the Brussels 
Convention is thus predicated upon the existence of an international element, yet the 
Convention itself is silent as to the nature and extent of this requisite international element. 
A recent case decided by the ECJ, however, may have gone some way towards clarifying the 
extent of the scope of application of the Brussels Convention.  
IV THE GROUP JOSI CASE43 
The facts that gave rise to this case are as follows. The respondent, a Canadian insurance 
company, entered into a reinsurance contract with the appellant, a company domiciled in 
Belgium. The contract had been brokered by a French company, acting as agent of the 
respondent. Group Josi had been informed by the French agent that the main shareholders 
in the reinsurance contract were two United States reinsurance companies. Immediately 
prior to the acceptance of the reinsurance offer by Group Josi, the two United States 
companies informed the French agent that they intended to pull out of the reinsurance 
contract. This information was not passed on to Group Josi. 
When the French agent sent Group Josi a statement of account a year later showing the 
amount owing in respect of Group Josi's share of the risk, Group Josi, which by this time 
had learned of the decision of the two United States companies to exit the deal, refused to 
pay, claiming that it had been induced to enter into the reinsurance contract on the basis of 
information which subsequently proved to be false. 
UGIC brought proceedings against Group Josi in France. Group Josi argued that the 
French Courts lacked jurisdiction because the courts in Belgium had jurisdiction, pursuant 
to the Brussels Convention, based on the fact that the defendant's registered office was in 
Belgium. The French Court rejected this submission, holding that the Brussels Convention 
did not apply in respect of a Canadian company, and that the French Courts had jurisdiction 
by virtue of French domestic law.44 
Group Josi appealed this ruling to the Versailles Court of Appeal. The Court observed 
that the question of whether the specific rules of the Brussels Convention can be used 
  
41 See, for example, Adrian Briggs "Forum Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention Again" (1991) 
107 LMCLQ 180, 182.  
42 Brussels Convention, preamble. 
43 Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company [2000] ILPR 549; [2001] QB 
68 (ECJ). 
44  Group Josi, above, para 26. 
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against a plaintiff domiciled in a non-Contracting State involves the question of extending 
European Community law to non-member countries. Recognising that a decision on this 
question required an interpretation of the Brussels Convention, the Court referred the 
matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
The ECJ was asked: "Does the Brussels Convention apply not only to intra-Community 
disputes but also to disputes which are integrated into the Community? More particularly, 
can a defendant established in a Contracting State rely on the specific rules on jurisdiction 
set out in that Convention against a plaintiff domiciled in Canada?"45 
In its judgment, the Court began by outlining the general scheme of the Brussels 
Convention as it relates to determination of jurisdiction. It noted that article 2 sets out the 
general rule that persons domiciled in a Contracting State are to be sued in the courts of that 
State, irrespective of the nationality of the parties.46  
This fundamental principle may be derogated from in certain instances. The Court noted 
two categories of cases. First, where the fact situation is covered by a rule of special 
jurisdiction, the defendant may be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in 
which it is domiciled and sued in a court of another Contracting State. Second, where a 
situation is covered by a rule of exclusive jurisdiction in relation to certain subject-matter, or 
a prorogation of jurisdiction, for example on the basis of a choice of forum clause, the 
defendant must be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which it is 
domiciled and sued in a court of another Contracting State. None of these specific rules 
were held to be relevant in this case. 
The Court found, then, that it is only in quite exceptional cases that the domicile of the 
plaintiff is decisive in conferring jurisdiction.47 They concluded on the basis of their analysis 
of the scheme of the Brussels Convention that as a general rule the domicile of the plaintiff 
is not relevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction pursuant to the Brussels 
Convention. Application of the rules of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels Convention 
is dependent solely on the criterion of the defendant being domiciled in a Contracting 
State.48 This led to the conclusion that the rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels Convention 
may be applied to a dispute between a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State and a 
plaintiff domiciled in a non-member country.49 
  
45  Group Josi, above, para 32. 
46  Group Josi, above, para 34. 
47  Group Josi, above, para 47. 
48 Group Josi, above, para 57. 
49  Group Josi, above, para 59. 
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V WHERE TO FROM HERE? THE IMPACT OF GROUP JOSI 
Given the controversy surrounding the compatibility of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens and the Brussels Convention, does the ECJ ruling in Group Josi change anything? 
While the ECJ was clear that the principles laid down by the Brussels Convention can be 
invoked by domicilaries of non-Contracting States, what is less clear are the implications of 
such a finding. Some commentators immediately sounded the death-knell for the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens, suggesting that a stay on the grounds of forum non conveniens is no 
longer available whenever the defendant is domiciled in the United Kingdom.50 It is 
questionable, however, whether Group Josi has this effect.   
In Group Josi, the ECJ stated clearly that the domicile of the plaintiff is not relevant for 
the purpose of applying the rules of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels Convention, 
and that the Brussels Convention can apply to a dispute between a defendant domiciled in a 
Contracting State and a plaintiff domiciled in a non-Contracting State. However, the ECJ did 
not expressly address the wider question of which cases the Brussels Convention can apply 
to. 
It is important to recognise a difference between who can invoke the principles of the 
Brussels Convention and when the principles of the Brussels Convention apply. Consider a 
situation where a party to a dispute argues that a forum other than that of their domicile 
should hear the case. It is to the appropriateness of the desired forum in light of the 
jurisdictional rules that the Brussels Convention speaks, rather than to whether the party 
can invoke the rules given that they are domiciled in a particular jurisdiction. The Brussels 
Convention decides conflicts of jurisdiction where the case is connected with the European 
Union, not conflicts of domicile. This is so regardless of the domicile of the parties.  
Indeed, the United Kingdom Courts have observed that the Harrods decision was based 
on the location of the competing fora and not on the respective domiciles of the parties.51 In 
the Group Josi case, despite the fact that the plaintiff was domiciled in a non-Contracting 
State, the conflict of jurisdiction was between the courts of two Contracting States: The 
plaintiff contended that the courts of France had jurisdiction, while the defendant 
contended that the courts of Belgium had jurisdiction. Thus, the conflict was between courts 
of two Contracting States, and it is no surprise that the ECJ found the Brussels Convention 
applied to determine jurisdiction. On this interpretation, the decision in Group Josi does not 
break any significant new ground; the ratio merely confirms that it is possible for a 
domiciliary of a non-Contracting State to invoke the Brussels Convention when there is a 
  
50 Douglas Peden "Litigator's View" (2000) The Lawyer, 13; John Melville Williams "Forum Non 
Conveniens, Lubbe v Cape and Group Josi v Universal General Insurance" (2001) 1 JPIL 72, 77. 
51  Societe Commerciale de Reassurance v Eras International Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 All ER 278, 298 (QB) Potter J. 
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conflict of jurisdiction between Contracting States. The scope of application does not change 
from the Court of Appeal's interpretation in Harrods: The Brussels Convention applies to 
conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts of two Contracting States and in such instances 
the discretionary power to grant a stay on forum non conveniens grounds would not be 
available.  
Do the mandatory rules of the Brussels Convention apply to a scenario where a 
domiciliary of a non-Contracting State sues a domiciliary of a Contracting State, and the 
conflict of jurisdiction is between courts of those two states or even a third country, also not 
a Contracting State, thereby precluding the availability of a plea of forum non conveniens? For 
example, consider a situation where a person domiciled in New Zealand sues a person 
domiciled in the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom defendant argues that the case 
should be heard in New Zealand or even a third country that is also not a member of the 
European Union. The conflict of jurisdiction is between the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand or the United Kingdom and the third country. Does the Brussels Convention 
apply? Is the case to be heard in the defendant's domicile pursuant to the mandatory rule in 
article 2 of the Brussels Convention, and is the defendant precluded from seeking a stay of 
proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens in favour of a New Zealand or third-
country Court? 
Group Josi would say that the mere fact that the plaintiff is domiciled in New Zealand 
does not in itself prevent the plaintiff from invoking the Brussels Convention.52 The wider 
question, however, is whether this is a conflict of jurisdiction to which the Brussels 
Convention speaks. It is on this point that the ECJ is silent. If the ratio of the Group Josi case 
is read as a statement on when the Brussels Convention can apply, as distinct from who can 
invoke the Brussels Convention, then this would represent a different and expansive view 
of the scope of the Convention, and would overrule the view of the Court of Appeal in 
Harrods. As this is a case involving a conflict of jurisdiction between the courts of a 
Contracting State and those of a competing forum, the requisite international element exists 
and the mandatory rules of the Brussels Convention apply. A discretionary stay on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens would, then, not be available whenever the defendant was 
domiciled in the United Kingdom, as it is inconsistent with the Brussels Convention.  
It is submitted that while this interpretation may be a welcome outcome in terms of 
contributing to procedural certainty, it may be questioned whether Group Josi on its face 
goes this far. Interpreting the ratio in light of the facts of the case, the United Kingdom 
Courts may be cautious in regarding the decision as being a complete and authoritative 
statement on when the Brussels Convention applies. This is particularly so given the 
  
52 Group Josi, above, para 57. 
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apparent reluctance of the United Kingdom Courts to depart from the doctrine and the fact 
that the Harrods case itself was decided on the basis of competing fora, not the domiciles of 
the parties. 
VI RECONSIDERING THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION IN 
LIGHT OF GROUP JOSI 
It may be possible, however, to reconstruct the argument in favour of finding an 
expansive scope to the Brussels Convention by drawing on elements of United Kingdom 
jurisprudence and observations of the ECJ. United Kingdom Courts have accepted that 
where jurisdiction is conferred upon a court pursuant to an international convention dealing 
with particular matters, the question of whether a stay of proceedings on the grounds of 
forum non conveniens is available depends on whether the doctrine is expressly or impliedly 
permitted by the particular convention.53 The case of Milor Srl v British Airways Plc involved 
the determination of jurisdiction pursuant to the Warsaw Convention 1929 dealing with 
aviation matters. The Court of Appeal noted the Warsaw Convention provisions dealing 
with jurisdiction were a jurisdictional code agreed upon by the Contracting Parties which 
provided the plaintiff with a limited choice of competent jurisdictions, each of which to a 
greater or lessor degree was likely to be appropriate for the bringing of a claim and it was 
implicit that there was no scope for an individual court to impose a venue that conflicted 
with the plaintiff's choice.54 In addition, only a small number of signatory countries 
recognised the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the Court observed that it would be 
surprising if the contracting parties to the convention had preserved to that small minority 
of countries which applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens a power to affect the choice 
of the forum in which a dispute should be tried by a process unknown to the majority of the 
parties.55 On this basis, then, the doctrine was found to be incompatible with the Warsaw 
Convention. 
The essence of the reasoning, then, is the question of the survival of forum non conveniens 
vis-à-vis an international convention depends on whether it can be applied consistently with 
the convention in question. What about the Brussels Convention? As a starting point it 
should be noted that the 1982 implementing legislation provides that "any question as to the 
meaning or effect of the [Brussels] Convention shall, if not regarded to the European Court 
in accordance with the Protocol of 1971, be determined in accordance with the principles 
  
53  Milor Srl v British Airways Plc [1996] QB 702 (CA). 
54  Milor, above, 708. 
55  Milor, above. 
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laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court.56 This was also the starting 
point for the Court in Harrods, who observed that the answer to the question before the 
court depends on the true construction of the Brussels Convention and that is a matter of 
European law.57  
The Brussels Convention does not expressly permit the exercise of forum non conveniens, 
and following the same reasoning as the Court in Milor, as only a small minority of Brussels 
Convention Contracting States recognise the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it would be 
implicit that the doctrine is unavailable where jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to the 
Brussels Convention. Furthermore, regarding the interpretation of provisions of the Brussels 
Convention, the ECJ in Group Josi stressed that there can be no derogations from the general 
rule that the courts of the defendant's domicile have jurisdiction except for those expressly 
provided for in the Convention, and these exceptions must be construed strictly.58 
Given also that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a mechanism for curtailing the 
excesses of common law jurisdiction in disputes involving two common law jurisdictions, it 
seems odd that the doctrine could survive where jurisdiction could be appropriately 
determined on the basis of alternative principles clearly articulated in an international 
instrument. The rules in the Brussels Convention determine appropriateness, and an 
additional discretionary examination of the suitability of the forum is superfluous at best.   
The conclusion, then, seems clear: Where the Brussels Convention applies, the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens cannot. The question of compatibility of the doctrine with the 
Brussels Convention does not in a strict sense arise: the two are, in their current form, 
incompatible. This is indeed the conclusion reached by Schlosser in his report on the 
Brussels Convention.59  
Again, this is not inconsistent with Harrods. The Harrods decision implied that the 
doctrine would be precluded where the Brussels Convention was held to be applicable. The 
Court of Appeal agreed in principle that a stay on the grounds of forum non conveniens was 
not available in cases where the two competing jurisdictions were both Contracting States 
  
56  Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982 (UK), s 3(1). The ECJ can give definitive rulings on the 
interpretation of the Brussels Convention pursuant to article 1 of the 1971 Protocol on 
Interpretation.  
57  In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72, 95 (CA) Dillon LJ. 
58  Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company [2000] ILPR 549; [2001] QB 
68, para 49 (ECJ). 
59 Peter F Scholsser "Report on the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom to the Brussels Convention" (1979) OJ C 59/71, para 78. 
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(that is, England and another Contracting State).60 However, it found that there was nothing 
to prevent the application of the doctrine when the conflict is between the courts of England 
and the courts of a non-Contracting State. In the Court's view, the Brussels Convention did 
not apply.  
This view of the Brussels Convention as only regulating jurisdiction as between 
Contracting States was echoed by Lord Goff in the Airbus Industrie case, where he remarked 
that "the primary purpose of the Convention is to ensure that there shall be no clash 
between the jurisdictions of member states of the Community".61 
Such a narrow view of the scope of the Convention has been criticised, however, by a 
number of commentators. The predominant view, particularly in Continental Europe is that 
the Brussels Convention has universalistic effect: It is intended to set mandatory rules of 
jurisdiction for the Contracting States for all disputes that fall within its subject matter and 
personal scope.62 The Jenard report described one of the purposes of the Brussels 
Convention as achieving the greatest possible legal certainty by establishing common rules 
of jurisdiction.63 Interpreting the Brussels Convention as having universalist effect, it is 
argued, ensures predictability and certainty and also that those domiciled in a Contracting 
State have equal rights and obligations.64 Indeed, this is the essence of Justice Hobhouse's 
reasoning in Berisford, the first instance decision that held that the Brussels Convention can 
apply to a conflict of jurisdiction between a court of a Contracting State and those of non-
Contracting States.65 
The question arises, then, which disputes fall within the subject-matter and personal 
scope of the Brussels Convention? It has been observed that the text of the Brussels 
Convention itself contains no indications that any limitations on its application are 
intended.66 How, then, ought the Brussels Convention be construed? 
Crucially, the judgment of the ECJ in Group Josi could be read as addressing a key 
concern of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Harrods. Dillon LJ remarked that if 
article 2 of the Brussels Convention has full mandatory effect in cases where the defendant 
  
60 Harrods, above, 93. 
61 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119, 132 (HL) Lord Goff. 
62 See, for example, Wendy Kennett "Forum Non Conveniens in Europe" (1995) 54 CLJ 552, 562. 
63 P Jenard "Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters" (1979) OJ C 59/1, 15. 
64 Kennett, above. 
65 S & W Berisford Plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1990] 2 QB 631. 645 Hobhouse J. 
66 Kennett, above. 
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is domiciled in England and the plaintiff is domiciled overseas, an agreement between the 
parties to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court would be useless, as English Courts 
would find themselves bound to hear the case pursuant to the mandatory provisions of 
article 2. However the ECJ stated that special rules of exclusive jurisdiction as provided in 
article 17 are equally applicable if the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State and the 
plaintiff is domiciled in a non-member country.67 Thus a choice of forum clause would be 
upheld under the Brussels Convention, even where the defendant is domiciled in a 
Contracting State.  
Another recent decision by the ECJ appears to further support this view. In Coreck 
Maritime v Handelsveem, the ECJ stated that the first paragraph of Article 17 of the Brussels 
Convention, relating to choice of forum clauses, applies only if, first, at least one of the 
parties to the original contract is domiciled in a Contracting State and, secondly, the parties 
agree to submit any disputes before a court or the courts of a Contracting State.68 Thus it 
appears that the ECJ does indeed see the Brussels Convention as applicable even where only 
one of the parties is domiciled in a contracting state and the potential conflict of jurisdiction 
is between courts of a Contracting State and a non-Contracting State. 
Interestingly too, there is evidence that United Kingdom Courts are prepared to accept 
an expansive application of the principles of the Brussels Convention and hold that 
exclusive jurisdiction clauses of the kind countenanced by article 17 should be applied even 
where the clause was in favour of a non-Contracting State. In Ace Insurance, the trial judge, 
Justice Longmore, remarked that it would be odd if an agreement to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of a non-Contracting State had to be treated as ineffective in any 
Brussels Convention country.69 
On the basis of this the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Harrods begins to break 
down. If the court was faced with a situation where the parties were both domiciled in 
Contracting States and there was an agreement between the parties to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of a non-Contracting State, would the court, given that the case 
involves a dispute between two domiciliaries of Contracting States, apply the mandatory 
provisions of the Brussels Convention and hold that the case must be heard in England? It is 
submitted that the United Kingdom Courts would uphold the choice of forum clause, even 
  
67 Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company [2000] ILPR 549; [2001] QB 
68, paras 41-42 (ECJ). 
68  Coreck Maritime GmdH v Handelsveem BV (2000) Case C-387/98 (OJ C 28, 27/01/2001). 
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though there is a conflict of jurisdiction between courts of a Contracting State and those of a 
non-Contracting State.70 Logically, this suggests one of three conclusions: 
• The mandatory provisions of the Brussels Convention are not so mandatory after 
all; 
• The distinction between domiciliaries and courts of Contracting States and those of 
non-Contracting States is not a tidy one; 
• The rules of the Brussels Convention can be held to apply in circumstances 
analogous to the provisions of the Brussels Convention. Thus, the choice of forum 
clause would be upheld, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the chosen forum 
pursuant to article 17, applying mutatis mutandis.71 
The first proposition would totally undermine the Brussels Convention. The aim of the 
Brussels Convention is to provide mandatory rules for the determination of jurisdiction in 
matters that come within the scope of the Convention, and to therefore achieve the greatest 
possible legal certainty.72 Any wavering from this position would inevitably create legal 
uncertainty. Arguably, the better view is a combination of the latter two propositions. In 
short, the Brussels Convention operates more effectively if it is read as being equally 
applicable in a situation where the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State and the 
plaintiff in a non-Contracting State, and where there is a conflict of jurisdiction between the 
courts of Contracting State and non-Contracting State. The connection with Europe is 
satisfied and the provisions of the Brussels Convention can be applied to settle the conflict. 
Continental European writers have long argued for recognition of a reflexive effect of the 
Brussels Convention. Thus, while it is conceded that the Brussels Convention cannot, and 
should not, confer jurisdiction on the courts of a non-Contracting State, the principles of the 
Brussels Convention can nevertheless be applicable where a non-Contracting State asserts 
jurisdiction on a basis that is accepted within the Brussels Convention as conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction on that court. The assertion by the court of the non-Contracting State 
will be taken into account and the principles inherent in the Brussels Convention will be 
applied accordingly.73 
  
70  Indeed, this much can be said given the remarks by Longmore J in Ace Insurance, above. 
71 The United Kingdom Courts have already made judicial reference to academic discussion of 
application of Convention principles by analogy. See Ace Insurance SA-NV v Zurich Insurance 
Company and Zurich America Insurance Company [2001] EWCA CIV 173, para 40 (CA). 
72 P Jenard "Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters"(1979) OJ C 59/1, 15. 
73  Wendy Kennett "Forum Non Conveniens in Europe" (1995) 54 Camb LJ 552, 563. 
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The principles could be used, for example, to enforce a choice of forum clause conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction on a court, either by conferring jurisdiction on a Contracting State or 
by operating to force a stay of proceedings commenced in a Contracting State in a case 
where the choice of forum clause provided that a court in a non-Contracting State has 
competent jurisdiction. Such an interpretation is suggested as providing a compromise 
between the extreme positions of a complete denial and a total acceptance of forum non 
conveniens.74 
Is this extra-territorial application of a convention to countries not a party to the 
convention? Strictly speaking, no it is not. It is not conferring jurisdiction on the courts of a 
non-Contracting State and it is not precluding a case from being heard in the courts of a 
non-Contracting State. Where the private international law rules of a non-Contracting State 
operate so as to grant jurisdiction over a case to a court in a manner consistent with the 
Brussels Convention, the rules of the Brussels Convention can be applied if proceedings are 
brought in the courts of a Contracting State so as to address the conflict of jurisdictions 
between those two courts. The lis pendens, or related actions rules, could be applied by a 
court in a Contracting State to stay proceedings in a court in a Contracting State where 
proceedings have already been brought in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction on the basis of 
criteria recognised by the Brussels Convention. In this way, the provisions of the Brussels 
Convention could operate to decide conflicts of jurisdiction, without the need for 
discretionary intervention by the courts. 
While the Brussels Convention contributes greatly to simplicity and predictability in 
cross-border litigation by determining the appropriate jurisdiction on the basis of clearly 
articulated rules, the Brussels Convention scheme is not without its problems. The ECJ in 
Group Josi observed75 that a plaintiff may avail themselves of a choice between jurisdiction 
on the basis of the defendant's domicile76 and jurisdiction on the basis of fact-specific 
criteria such as place of performance of contract.77 This creates an opportunity for forum 
shopping.  
The prevention of forum shopping is often cited as one of the justifications for the use of 
the discretionary power of forum non conveniens.78 The United Kingdom Courts have, 
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however, exhibited some degree of ambivalence in regards to the possibility of limited 
forum shopping under international conventions dealing with jurisdiction matters. In Milor 
Srl v British Airways Plc, the Court noted that the Warsaw Convention provided the plaintiff 
with an option of bringing proceedings in a multiplicity of fora.79 The Court was not 
prepared to nullify this option, and rejected an argument that a stay was nevertheless 
available on the ground of forum non conveniens. Indeed, the Court went out of its way to 
preserve the option for the plaintiff. 
In summary, then, a reexamination of the Brussels Convention in light of European and 
United Kingdom jurisprudence suggests that the Convention operates logically and 
effectively if it is interpreted as being applicable to all international disputes that have an 
appropriate European element, for example a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State, 
facts that give rise to special jurisdiction in terms of article 5, or a choice of forum clause in 
terms of article 17. This is the case even if the conflict of jurisdiction is between courts of a 
Contracting State and a non-Contracting State. The nature of the case is international, and 
the Brussels Convention applies to determine the appropriate forum on the basis of clearly 
articulated rules. 
VII AMENDING THE CONNECTING FACTOR REQUIREMENTS FOR 
DOMICILE 
As argued above, there is strong support within the ECJ for the view that the Brussels 
Convention is applicable where only one party to a dispute is domiciled in a Contracting 
State. This is supported by academics, particularly in mainland Europe.80 Furthermore, 
there is evidence of a growing acquiescence of this interpretation within United Kingdom 
Courts. If this is accepted as the true scope of application of the Brussels Convention, then a 
stay of proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens would be unavailable where the 
defendant was domiciled in the United Kingdom or alternatively where any of the rules of 
special jurisdiction or exclusive jurisdiction were satisfied, resulting in the United Kingdom 
Courts having jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention.   
Acceptance of an expansive scope of application of the Brussels Convention may, 
however, create situations that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was designed to avoid – 
in particular, a case being heard in a jurisdiction with very little substantial link with the 
dispute. In Harrods, for example, the Court of Appeal was certainly mindful of the fact that 
Argentina was a more appropriate forum than England. The defendant company was 
incorporated in England, and by virtue of this formal connection was deemed to be 
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domiciled in England for the purposes of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.81 
This was despite the fact that in substance all the business of the company was done in 
Argentina, which was also the place of effective management of the company. Now, if the 
mandatory rules of the Brussels Convention were to apply, England would have jurisdiction 
by virtue of the defendant's domicile and a stay of proceedings on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens in favour of proceedings in Argentina would be unavailable. The application of 
the Brussels Convention was, of course, rejected by the Court.  
However, this situation could be remedied by a revision of the definition of domicile of a 
corporation for purposes of jurisdictional matters. Article 53 of the Brussels Convention 
allows Contracting States to determine for themselves the connecting factors necessary to 
establish domicile. Section 41 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 provides that 
an individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom if he or she is resident there. Section 42 
adopts a dual definition for the determination of the domicile of a corporation: A 
corporation is domiciled in England if it is incorporated under United Kingdom law or its 
central management and control is located in the United Kingdom.82  
The use by the United Kingdom of the place of incorporation as an appropriate 
connecting factor for the determination of a corporation's domicile is somewhat rare among 
European States, with only the Netherlands employing a similar criterion.83 A more 
common criterion is the place of effective management or control or the principle place of 
business.84 This is seen as a more appropriate connecting factor and basis for determining 
domicile.  
Adoption by the United Kingdom of an alternative standard for determining domicile, 
more in line with other European countries, could go some way towards addressing a 
practical concern with applying the mandatory provisions of the Brussels Convention on a 
wider basis. It would reduce the risk of a case being heard in a forum inappropriate in terms 
of its degree of connection to the parties and the case as a whole, and thus obviate the need 
for a discretionary power such as forum non conveniens.  
  
81  Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 42(3)(a). 
82 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 42(3). 
83 See, for example, article 10(2) of the Dutch Civil Code. See also, Stephen O'Malley and Alexander 
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VIII ADOPTION OF A MORE LIMITED FORM OF FORUM NON 
CONVENIENS? 
Given the almost infinite possible fact situations that can arise in cross-border disputes, 
it might be argued that some degree of flexibility ought to be available to ensure that the 
case is heard in the most suitable forum, rather than jurisdiction being decided by a purely 
mechanical application of specific criteria. Thus, in reexamining the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens and its relationship with the Brussels Convention, alternative approaches might 
also be considered.  
Firstly, it is noteworthy that the United Kingdom doctrine of forum non conveniens has 
not been adopted by all common law countries. Australian Courts, for example, have 
rejected the Spiliada approach. The Spiliada test is essentially a two step analysis, involving 
first a requirement that the defendant show that there is available a more appropriate 
forum, that is, one in which the case could be tried more suitably for the interests of all 
parties and for the ends of justice, and secondly, once the defendant has established a prima 
facie case for a stay, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that there are circumstances by 
reason of which justice requires that the United Kingdom Court exercise its jurisdiction.85 
The Australian Courts, on the other hand, adopt a narrower test. Instead of looking to 
whether there is a clearly more appropriate forum abroad, the Australian doctrine examines 
whether the Australian forum is "clearly inappropriate", that is, seriously and unfairly 
burdensome, prejudicial, or damaging to the defendant.86   Justice Deane, in supporting this 
approach, stated that "it is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that, where jurisdiction exists, 
access to the courts is a right. It is not a privilege which can be withdrawn otherwise than in 
clearly defined circumstances".87   
A further alternative approach is offered by the Special Commission of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law charged with the task of authoring a draft 
international convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. One of the more contentious matters during the drafting process was 
the question of the adoption of a forum non conveniens clause and a lis pendens clause.88  
The draft convention provides for limited forum non conveniens test which represents a 
compromise between the competing philosophies of common law and civil law countries. 
  
85 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 476-482 (HL) Lord Goff. 
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The draft convention allows the suspension of a case, in exceptional circumstances, if the 
court seised is clearly inappropriate to decide the case and if a court of another State has 
jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute.89 The language is similar 
to that of the Australian approach, in that a greater emphasis is placed on the unsuitability 
of the forum seised and could be seen as moving away from the wider United Kingdom 
approach. The draft provides an illustrative list of factors to be taken into account by the 
court in coming to its decision, including the parties' habitual residence, the nature and 
location of the evidence and procedures for obtaining such evidence, time limitations, and 
the possibility of recognition and enforcement of a judgment on its merits.90 Under the draft 
regime, the court granting the stay specifies the time frame during which proceedings must 
be brought in the alternative forum. If this time frame is not adhered to or the alternative 
forum declines to exercise jurisdiction, then the original court shall exercise jurisdiction.91 
While both the Australian approach and the draft convention appear to limit the 
instances in which a stay of proceedings for reasons of forum non conveniens would be 
granted, the proposed scheme does not in any real sense move away from the discretionary 
regime provided for in United Kingdom law. The mere fact that the court has the discretion 
to grant a stay in itself creates the uncertainty and the potential for additional costs in cross-
border litigation. While the Australian and draft convention approaches may reduce the 
number of successful applications for a stay, they arguably will not stop defendants from 
trying. That is ultimately the weakness of the discretionary regime. 
IX CONCLUSIONS – THE FUTURE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
It has been suggested that the retention of a discretion based on forum non conveniens is a 
way of avoiding the devotion of scarce judicial resources to cases that have only a minimal 
linkage with the United Kingdom, as indeed was the case in Harrods.92 Yet forum non 
conveniens litigation can often be just as time consuming and costly as a substantive hearing, 
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nullifying any gain in judicial economy. Such arguments have also not gone unnoticed by 
United Kingdom Courts. In Milor, Lord Justice Phillips observed that:93 
[w]here, as so often, substantial costs are incurred in interlocutory battles in relation to 
jurisdiction, I have a suspicion that the object of the exercise is frequently not to ensure that the 
trial takes place in the appropriate forum, but to achieve a better negotiating stance in the action 
which neither side expects to get to trial. There is something to be said for a regime which 
restricts the choice of forum in a manner which excludes those which are likely to be 
inappropriate, but which does not otherwise permit the plaintiff's choice to be challenged. 
The abuse of forum non conveniens in this manner was probably not contemplated by the 
House of Lords when they reformulated the doctrine some fifteen years ago. Lord 
Templeman, in his brief speech in the Spiliada case, expressed his hope that the newly 
formulated forum non conveniens test would be applied by a first instance judge in chambers 
after quiet contemplation of written submissions, the issue being resolved in a matter of 
hours and without the added complication of appeals.94 Unfortunately, the reality has 
proved to be somewhat different.  
Indeed, the need for increased certainty of procedure in international dispute cases can 
be supported by reference to the protracted interlocutory litigation that occurred recently in 
the Lubbe v Cape Plc case.95 This case involved a personal injury claim by South African 
workers who suffered disease (in some cases died) from working in an asbestos mine 
owned and operated by a company domiciled in the United Kingdom. The plaintiffs 
commenced proceedings for compensation in the United Kingdom, but were immediately 
met by a barrage of interlocutory motions, including an application for a stay of proceedings 
on the ground of forum non conveniens. The defendant argued that the case should be heard 
in South Africa. After no less than three first instance hearings, two appeals to the Court of 
Appeal, and finally, a House of Lords decision, the defendant's application for a stay was 
denied; the plaintiffs would get their day in a United Kingdom Court. But this merry-go-
round of interlocutory litigation could have been avoided if the Brussels Convention had, 
from the outset, been held to apply. On the basis that the defendant was domiciled in the 
United Kingdom, the United Kingdom Courts would have jurisdiction under article 2 of the 
Brussels Convention, and the possibility of a stay on the ground of forum non conveniens 
would be unavailable.  
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There is much to be said for certainty and the avoidance of protracted interlocutory 
litigation, particularly in cases of a transnational nature where the potential for burgeoning 
litigation costs is apparent. Extending the scope of application of the Brussels Convention 
would go a long way towards achieving this in situations where a defendant domiciled in 
the United Kingdom is being sued in United Kingdom Courts. Group Josi arguably settles 
the question of whether the fact that one of the parties is not a domiciliary of a Contracting 
State will prevent the Brussels Convention from being invoked. The Court found it will not. 
While the Group Josi case arguably does not settle the wider issue, in that it does not 
expressly address the question of the application of the Brussels Convention to a situation 
where there is a conflict of jurisdiction between the courts of a Contracting State and those 
of a non-Contracting State, it most certainly should be seen as an important step in the right 
direction. While there is evidence that the United Kingdom Courts are beginning to warm to 
such a development, the need for a conclusive decision on this matter is clear. 
It is further submitted that the potential for cases to be heard in jurisdictions that have 
no more than a minimal link with the dispute, seen as a justification for the exercise of a 
discretionary stay, could be immediately alleviated by amending the provisions in the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982 that provide the criteria for determining the domicile of 
a company. To hold that for the purposes of jurisdiction a company is domiciled in the 
country of its incorporation, while formalistically satisfactory, can nevertheless give rise to 
the unsatisfactory conclusion that the company must be sued in a country in which, in a 
substantive sense, does not represent the country in which it carries on its business nor is its 
centre of management and control. 
An amendment rejecting the place of incorporation as the domicile of a company would 
make the application of the Brussels Convention to a case where the plaintiff was a 
domiciliary of a non-Contracting State less problematic. This would ensure a strong 
European connection to the case, notwithstanding that there is a non-European element, 
thus obviating the need for a discretionary power.  
The implication for companies and practitioners in New Zealand and other non-
European countries contemplating the future possibility of litigating in the United Kingdom 
is clear. The Brussels Convention may be poised to become the sole determinant of conflicts 
of jurisdiction, where the defendant is domiciled in the United Kingdom or other 
substantive provisions are satisfied, and there is a need to be watchful of future judicial 
developments on this issue. Such a development ought to be welcomed as a positive step 
towards adding clarity and certainty to international litigation. 
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